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Water markets as a vehicle for water reform:
the case of New South Wales
Lin Crase, Leo O'Reilly and Brian Dollery*
Water reform in NSW is being undertaken using an adaptive approach in
recognition of the uncertainty and imperfect knowledge embodied in the riverine
environment. However, the reform process also relies, in part, on the ability of
markets for tradable water entitlements to develop and thereby assist in allocating
scarce water resources to their highest value use. This article explores impediments
to the formation of e¤cient markets in permanent tradable water entitlements in
NSW. The article concludes that more attention should be paid to market failures
and related problems which manifest themselves in thin markets for permanent
water entitlements.
1. Introduction
Historically Australia's water resources have been seen as a factor of
production to be harnessed in both agricultural and industrial contexts to
provide a stimulus to regional economic development. Water resources and
their allocation were thus intrinsically tied to social and strategic objectives
associated with regional economic development, such as closer settlement
and soldier settlement (Langford-Smith and Rutherford 1966). This view
informed water resource policy in Australia until the 1980s (Watson 1990,
p. 11). Until then only limited consideration had been given to the true
opportunity cost of water usage and the potentially deleterious e¡ects of
speci¢c uses.
Since the 1980s the `development' hypothesis has been supplanted by the
`management' hypothesis consistent with a more mature water economy.
This water economy is characterised by `inelastic supply of ªnew'' water and
the need for expensive rehabilitation of aging projects' (Randall 1981,
p. 195). The water management regime consistent with a mature water
economy also requires policy-makers to broaden the scope of water policy
# Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000,
108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK or 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
The Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 44:2, pp. 299^321
*Lin Crase is a Lecturer in Economics, School of Business, La Trobe University,
Wodonga; Leo O'Reilly is a Lecturer in Accounting and Electronic Commerce, School of
Business, La Trobe University, Wodonga; and Brian Dollery is Associate Professor in
Economics, Department of Economics, University of New England, Armidale.objectives to include economic e¤ciency, sustainable development and eco-
logical sustainability (Watson 1990, p. 12). This is re£ected in the increasing
pressure on the allocation of water resources to multiple environmental and
economic objectives. In the Australian context, this manifests itself in a
myriad of legislative reforms to the water industry, including the intro-
duction of market-based solutions to the allocation of water entitlements.
The reform process is of particular interest in NSW which has the largest
irrigation industry in Australia. For instance, average annual water extrac-
tions in NSW amount to approximately 7 million Ml with some 75 per cent
being used for irrigation. The NSW irrigation industry occupies about
820000 hectares and returns some $A2.1 billion to the state's economy
(Brinsley 1998, p. 3; Department of Land and Water Conservation [DLWC]
1998, p. 1). Among the various issues which arise from the reform of the
water sector is the identi¢cation of a legislative framework capable of accom-
modating the host of economic and environmental objectives now assigned
to water resource managers. In particular, the challenge in NSW is to create
a legislative framework that allocates water e¤ciently while simultaneously
recognising the legitimate claims of the environment to this resource.
An integral component of the reform of the water industry resides in the
introduction of tradable water entitlements and their exchange in a water
market. Markets for tradable water entitlements have often been presented
as a mechanism for smoothing the structural adjustment associated with a
mature water economy both in Australia and abroad. More speci¢cally, it
has been argued that breaking the nexus between property rights for land
and water and allowing water to be traded from low-value uses to high-value
uses, can release resources that facilitate the requisite adjustment of low-
value users. Simultaneously, high-value users are presumed to administer
water e¤ciently since pro¢t-maximising enterprises design their planning
processes around the true cost of the resource and in this way provide
incentives for extractive users to enhance water e¤ciency. In particular,
increased investment is predicted to £ow from the incentive to accrue excess
water entitlement which can be sold pro¢tably (Bauer 1997, p. 640). In some
cases water markets have even been presented as a mechanism for reducing
rural poverty (Thobani 1997). Needless to add, all of these arguments are, in
part, contingent on an e¤ciently functioning water market. Put di¡erently,
these arguments may not be sustainable in the presence of signi¢cant market
failure.
This article explores impediments to the formation of markets for
permanent tradable water entitlements in NSW. The article itself comprises
¢ve main sections. The second section outlines the legislative response of the
NSW government to the water reform process and examines evidence of
the development of a market framework in NSW water entitlements.
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with reference to other countries where a market framework has been
adopted. In the fourth section we examine the existing market impediments
in NSW. The article concludes with a brief discussion of the policy implica-
tions of the analysis.
2. Legislative background to water reform in NSW
In this section we attempt to establish the legislative foundations of water
markets in NSW as an integral component of the reform process. This
provides the basis for understanding the development of the water market.
2.1 The national setting
The signing of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Agreement
on Water Resource Policy (Water Reform Framework) in February 1994
and later the Competition Principles Agreement in April 1995 provided
additional impetus to the water reform process which had already begun in
many states. The strategic framework outlined a reform process which
addressed the perceived economic and environmental ine¤ciencies of the
existing administration of water resources. First, pricing practices were to be
reformed so that prices re£ected the full economic cost of resources, were
consumption based, removed cross-subsidies and made other subsidies
transparent. Moreover, by 2001 rural water charges should fully recover cost
and wherever practicable show a positive rate of return on the written-down
replacement cost of assets (National Competition Council [NCC] 1998,
p. 3). Second, a system of water allocations was to be implemented by states
which would recognise the legitimate demands of the environment and break
the nexus between land and water titles. Arrangements for the trading of
water entitlements were also to be implemented. Third, water agencies were
required to provide e¤cient water service delivery which separates
regulation, service delivery and water resource management functions, and
provides greater ¢nancial self-su¤ciency (Rigden 1998, p. 6). Moreover, in
Section 6(g) of the Water Reform Framework the principle that irrigation
customers be given greater control over the management of irrigation areas
was entrenched. Fourth, two-part tari¡s were to be adopted for urban water
users where this was cost-e¡ective. Finally, all future investments in the
water industry were to be encouraged only if they ful¢lled both economic
viability and ecological sustainability criteria.
Notwithstanding the complexity of these issues, subsuming the water
reform process within the ambit of National Competition Policy (NCP)
provides clear and signi¢cant ¢nancial incentives for states and territories to
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NCP reforms entitles individual states and territories to a per capita share of
around $A16 billion in transfers from the Commonwealth over eight years
to July 2006 (Furmage 1998, p. 3). Discussion of the ability of states to
introduce all of these policy changes lies beyond the scope of this article.
However, details of the various payments do provide a useful background to
legislative reform within NSW. The ¢rst tranche of payments was assessable
in 1997 but excluded an evaluation of water reform which was ¢rst included
in 1998. The second round of payments requires the e¡ective implementation
of all 1994 COAG agreements on the Water Reform Framework and is
assessable by July 1999. This includes adherence to the pricing principles
advocated by the Expert Group on Asset Valuation Methods and Cost
Recovery endorsed by COAG in 1995. The ¢nal tranche of payments relates
to assessments to be conducted by July 2001 and requires full implementa-
tion and continued observance of all COAG agreements with respect to
water (NCC 1998, p. 3).
A review of the institutional framework of the Murray^Darling Basin
Commission (MDBC) is also necessary to appreciate the complexity of the
policy environment in NSW. The MDBC is the operational arm of the
Murray^Darling Basin Ministerial Council (MDBMC) which comprises
government ministers from NSW, Victoria, South Australia, Queensland
and the Commonwealth. The MDBMC has a broad mandate to coordinate
the management of the Murray^Darling Basin. Both the MDBC and the
MDBMC owe their existence to the Murray^Darling Basin Agreement
which is set out in the Murray^Darling Basin Act dating from 1914. The
Agreement arose from protracted discussions between the states relating to
the `ownership' of the water resources of the Murray^Darling Basin. More
speci¢cally, con£ict arose between South Australia, which sought to protect
and develop the river for trade purposes, and NSW and Victoria, which
intended to exploit the river for irrigation purposes (Clark 1971, p. 26).
Despite several alterations to the Agreement since its inception, the basic
principles for the sharing of water resources between the states have
remained largely unchanged from 1914 (Alaouze and Whelan 1996, p. 16).
However, since the 1980s, modi¢cations to the Agreement re£ect growing
concerns over the environmental health of the basin and the need to
accommodate environmental objectives.
In 1994 an audit of water use in the Murray^Darling Basin was
commissioned by the MDBMC. An interim cap on water extractions at
1993^94 levels was imposed in 1995 after the audit pointed to the continued
rate of growth in extractions and the deleterious impact of the rate of
extractions on riverine environments (DLWC 1997, p. 1). The Independent
Audit Group was formed and provided reports to the MDBMC on progress
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In July 1997 the Council agreed to maintain the cap which restricted future
extractive usage of water while allowing for adjustments for annual stream-
£ow and climate changes. The Independent Audit Group continues to
monitor each state's progress and compliance with the cap and attempts to
provide an equitable arrangement between states. The structure of the
MDBC and its regulations highlight the complexity of the water industry in
NSW. More speci¢cally, in reviewing legislative arrangements and the
impact of reforms at a state level, it is important to note the signi¢cant
in£uence of the multiplicity of legislative tiers within the water industry and,
in particular, the impact of the cap on extractive users in NSW.
2.2 NSW water reforms
Management of irrigation water in NSW
In reviewing the national Water Reform Framework, we indicated that the
reform agenda included the sequestration of regulation, service delivery
and water management functions while simultaneously a¡ording irrigation
customers greater management control over irrigation areas. After adopting
this view in September 1997, a bulk water delivery business, NSW State
Water, was created, whose role is to e¤ciently deliver water to users as
determined by the resource assessment conducted by the resource manager
(Fishburn, Immaraj and Shields 1998, p. 4). The DLWC has retained the role
of resource manager or steward and NSW State Water operates as an
unincorporated arm of the DLWC reporting to the Director General. All
state irrigation schemes in NSW became autonomous private companies or
state-owned corporations in 1995 and 1997, respectively. In the case of the
former, the corporation is owned and operated by constituent irrigators who
hold shares in the irrigation company on the basis of established water
entitlements. In the latter case, the corporation operates independently of
DLWC although the government retains ownership through shareholder
Ministers. Each entity is licensed under the Irrigation Corporation Act, 1994
for a period of 15 years.
Pricing of water in NSW
An integral component of the water reform process resides in the e¤cient
pricing of the resource itself since under-pricing leads to ine¤cient water use,
particularly if the market for entitlements is not well developed. NSW has
been at the forefront of pricing reform for bulk water (Furmage 1998, p. 5).
Consumption-based pricing was ¢rst introduced in NSW by the Hunter
Water Corporation in 1982. Since November 1995 the Independent Pricing
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irrigators and major urban users, employing a process which is both trans-
parent and independent. The pricing principles used have sought to capture
broad economic costs, including provision for environmental costs, though
this continues to be a vexatious issue. The 1996 IPART interim report on
bulk water prices advocated ¢ve principles to be used in establishing bulk
water prices. First, water charges should be based on the e¤cient provision
of water services. Second, ¢nancial stability and sustainable service delivery
should be achieved. Third, pricing should encourage the best overall outcome
for the community. Fourth, costs should be borne by the speci¢c impactor
or bene¢ciary. And ¢nally, pricing should promote ecologically sustainable
water use (IPART 1996).
Water administration and licensing in NSW
The DLWC was formed in 1995 from the former Department of Water
Resources, Conservation and Land Management and some areas of Public
Works. It is empowered to set conditions on the extraction of water and
administer rural water licences in NSW. Currently about 5000 licences
operate on regulated rivers, some 12000 licences apply to unregulated rivers,
and around 70000 relate to ground water extractions (Fishburn et al. 1998,
p. 3; Alaouze and Whelan 1996, pp. 1^2; Brinsley 1998, pp. 3^4). In addition
to the Irrigation Corporations Act, 1994, which covers shareholder irrigators
operating within the recently privatised and corporatised irrigation schemes,
there are also some 50 aspects of state legislation which govern the activities
of licence holders. These include Regional and Local Environmental Plans,
State Environmental Planning Policies, Environmental Planning and Assess-
ment Act, Threatened Species Conservation Act, National Parks and Wildlife
Act, NSW Wetland Policy, River and Foreshore Improvement Act, Soil
Conservation Act, Pesticides and Allied Chemicals Act, Protection of the
Environment Operations Act, and the Murray^Darling Basin Act (Schroo
1998).
Among the most important legislation in the current context is the Water
Act which dates from 1912. This Act speci¢es the licensing to take water and
in this respect water rights accruing to irrigators can be appropriately
described as state property regimes (Bromley 1991). The Act itself is
generally more consistent with the `development' hypothesis of water
management than the features of a `mature' water economy. Moreover, `in
some areas the legislation was not su¤cient to prevent over-allocation of the
resource' (Brinsley 1998, p. 3). There are a number of other issues embedded
in the legislation which are inconsistent with the current reform agenda, such
as the speci¢cation of some water licences in terms of the area that can be
irrigated rather than the volume of water that can be extracted. While
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issues, many have tended to be piecemeal in approach and have resulted
in a complex and often inconsistent set of administration principles (ibid.,
pp. 3^4). The more recent Water Administration Act of 1986 has also
required amendment to re£ect the changing philosophy of water manage-
ment. For instance, in 1997 the Act was amended to include Ecological
Sustainability Development Principles.
In the present context the water allocation arrangements that operate in
the southern regions warrant speci¢c discussion since water trading is
concentrated in these areas (Marsden Jacob and Associates 1999, p. 3.9).
Historically the NSW management regime has, in part, aimed to maximise
water available for irrigation per season. However, the reliability with which
a water entitlement is met depends largely on the hydrology of the river
system and by implication seasonal conditions. Some horticultural enter-
prises and urban users are issued with high-security licences which guarantee
supply in all but the most severe droughts, although most water licences in
southern NSW have general security entitlements (Alaouze and Whelan
1996, pp. 2^3). That is, there is a nominal entitlement, with licensees relying
on regularly announced allocations to make production decisions. For
example, announcements are made in August with respect to the percentage
of entitlement that can be accessed by licensees on the basis of water
currently in storage. Subsequent rainfall in spring may see an upward
revision of the announced allocation and licensees are also permitted to use
`o¡-allocation' extractions when instream £ows are adjudged su¤cient.
Although this administrative system has proved to be relatively robust, it
does produce signi¢cant risk and uncertainty for some irrigators (Musgrave
1996, p. 48). Moreover, the inverse relationship between increased ex-
tractions and reliable supply, accompanied by pressure from environmental-
ists to reduce the security of water entitlements, has resulted in a complex
legislative and administrative framework. As this framework evolves from
the perceived changes to the objectives of water management, there are signi-
¢cant implications for the attenuation of extractive rights for irrigators.
In 1995 the NSW government announced six additional reforms that were
introduced in that year. First, water was speci¢cally allocated to the
Macquarie Marshes and the Gwydir wetlands, re£ecting the environmental
signi¢cance of these areas. Second, the Healthy Rivers Commission was
established to make recommendations with regard to rivers referred to it by
government. Third, processes were initiated for the development of interim
water quality and £ow objectives. Fourth, the setting of bulk water charges
was referred to IPART and a water management charge was imposed on
most users with the stated intent of funding asset refurbishment. Fifth, the
Water Advisory Council was established to provide a vehicle for community
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new licences on most coastal, unregulated streams and several groundwater
systems throughout the state (DLWC 1998b, pp. 2^6). In 1997 these reforms
were subsequently built upon by the establishment of River Management
Committees, extensive community consultation processes and the release of
numerous discussion papers and support packages. Perhaps the most
signi¢cant of these publications in the context of water markets is the
discussion paper titled Access and Use (DLWC 1998b). This paper raises
many of the di¤cult issues relating to property rights of water and the
transfer of these rights in a market setting. Following community con-
sultation the NSW government has scheduled the implementation of new
licensing regulations in 1999^2000.
1
Tradable water entitlements in NSW
The Water Reform Framework relies, in part, on the use of market
mechanisms to deliver an e¤cient allocation of water resources between the
competing demands of irrigators, urban/industrial users and the environment
(Topp and McClintock 1998, p. 1). To date, the role of water administrators in
NSW has included the setting of annual allocation of general security licensees
on the basis of hydrological data. An e¤cient allocation of water resources
by such a framework appears unlikely since some users are consistently `over-
allocated' whereas others are consistently `under-allocated'. Voluntary trade of
the resource between users is seen as a logical mechanism for improving the
allocation of the resource, particularly where there is an embargo on new
licences. The extent of the mis-allocation created by an administrative structure
without trade has been estimated to be around $A50 million annually in the
Murray^Darling Basin alone (Hall, Poulter and Curtotti 1993).
Annual transferability of water entitlements was ¢rst introduced in NSW
in 1983 while permanent transferability commenced in 1989 (Cummings 1990,
p. 186). The temporary trading of water between valleys has been possible in
recent years although permanent transfers are generally restricted to intra-
valley arrangements. A limited amount of permanent interstate trade
commenced in 1994^95 and the establishment of the MDBC interstate water
trading pilot project in 1998 has sought to expand this trade.
2 As much as
550000 Ml has been traded in total during some years with temporary inter-
valley trade between the Murrumbidgee and the lower Darling, and the
1Most recently, the government released a white paper for consolidating and updating
water management legislation as the next phase of implementation.
2The MDBC pilot project is restricted to private diverters in the Mallee border region
of NSW, Victoria and South Australia.
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100000 Ml, respectively (Brinsley 1998, p.6). There are a number of legislative
or administrative caveats at the local level which complicate the operation of
the water market. These limitations are largely designed to re£ect environ-
mental, physical and operational constraints but have developed on an ad hoc
basis (DLWC 1998a, p. 21). For example, in the largest irrigation district,
the Murray Irrigation Limited (MIL) area, licensors are only permitted to
permanently trade a maximum of 40 per cent of the entitlement originally
ascribed to a landholding. Any transfer is also subject to an assessment of the
hydrological loadings of properties. In some cases `temporary' trades of more
than one year can be negotiated between private individuals although local
trading rules only o¤cially recognise annual trades. Alternatively, in the
Murrumbidgee Irrigation Area even temporary transfers outside the irrigation
district have been restricted by local rules to preserve the engineering integrity
of the irrigation infrastructure. Constraints may also arise at the state level
where the DLWC intervenes in transfer arrangements in its capacity as water
resource steward. For instance, trading of sleeper and dozer licences on
unregulated rivers is currently prohibited. Sleeper licences have an entitlement
which has been consistently unused while dozer licences have a proportion of
entitlement which is inactive. The activation of these licences either threatens
the MDBMC cap or the access rights of other users. Thus, the DLWC must
make a determination on the treatment of these licences in the longer term
and the trading rules that will apply to such licences.
2.3 The development of water markets in NSW
Much has been made of the bene¢ts that can be derived from trading in
water entitlements. While reliable and comprehensive data on the quantity
and nature of trade are not yet available (Marsden Jacob and Associates
1999, p. 3.6), statistical information obtained from the DLWC Water
Analysis and Audit Unit points to the robust growth of temporary water
transfers in NSW (see table 1).
In recent years the volume of water traded annually on a temporary basis
has varied between 200000 Ml and 700000 Ml (DLWC 1998a, p. 4). This
represents as much as 10 per cent of the licensed volume of extractions from
regulated streams in NSW. By way of contrast, it is more di¤cult to pro-
claim the growth of the permanent water market. While the Water Analysis
and Audit Unit of the DLWC has only recently compiled information on
permanent transfers of water entitlement which are distinct from transfers of
land, there is the added complication that trades negotiated by private treaty
for up to ¢ve years are treated as temporary trades. Notwithstanding this
limitation, data from the DLWC Water Analysis and Audit Unit point to a
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title. These data support anecdotal evidence from local water managers
about the thinness of the permanent water market and appear in table 2.
For the years for which data are currently available the recorded volume
of permanent trades has failed to exceed more than 0.5 per cent of the total
water entitlement available for trade. This supports the observation by
Table 1 Summary of temporary transfers of water licences in NSW by volume, number
and year
Intra-valley transfers Inter-valley transfers*
Year No. Volume (Ml) No. Volume (Ml)
1983^84 4 2573 0 0
1984^85 17 3490 0 0
1985^86 56 40054 0 0
1986^87 39 44478 0 0
1987^88 215 100718 0 0
1988^89 104 41714 0 0
1989^90 202 78247 0 0
1990^91 147 66778 0 0
1991^92 458 174321 0 0
1992^93 310 68858 4 20800
1993^94 297 89391 10 5354
1994^95 1528 385887 504 126638
1995^96 815 281359 82 41359
1996^97 741 358668 68 41978
1997^98 1847 444213 133 62781
Note: *Operational data.
Source: Justine Harris, Water Analysis and Audit Unit, DLWC, 1999, e-mail, 30 June^1 July.
Table 2 Permanent water entitlement transfers by
volume and number in NSW
Intra-valley transfers










Source: Justine Harris, Water Analysis and Audit Unit,
DLWC, 1999, e-mail, 30 June^1 July
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entitlements transferred in 1997^98, including interstate transfers, were
permanent trade. It thus appears that the transfer of a small number of water
rights does not constitute a water market per se. Only when consumers and
producers undertake signi¢cant continuous voluntary exchange over time
can a market be proclaimed (Katz and Rosen 1994; Michelsen 1994).
In economic parlance, market failure arises where the unfettered market
produces an outcome which is not economically e¤cient in Pigouvian and
Paretian terms. Since e¤ciency implies that all mutually bene¢cial gains are
fully exploited, an alternative description of market failure centres on the
question of why some mutually bene¢cial trades remain unexploited by
rational economic agents. Gravelle and Rees (1992, p. 513) suggest that there
are three basic reasons why advantageous exchange may not occur. First,
individuals may not have su¤cient control of a commodity or resource to
undertake the necessary exchange. Second, high transaction and information
costs can erode the advantages of trade. And ¢nally, the individuals involved
in trade may be unable to negotiate and agree upon the terms of mutually
advantageous exchange. In the case of the market for permanent water
entitlements in NSW it may be that these causes manifest themselves in a
paucity of actual market interaction.
The relative thinness of the permanent water market in NSW has also been
analysed by Crase and Jackson (1998). In their review of strategic responses
of over 200 landholders to reduced water availability in the Murray Land
and Water Management Plan area, Crase and Jackson (1998) established
that only 2 per cent of farmers indicated that they would consider the sale of
their permanent water entitlement separate from land. Moreover, only 3
per cent indicated a preparedness to purchase permanent water when con-
fronted with limited access to the resource. Therefore, the question arises as
to the nature of the obstacles that appear to be limiting the development of
the permanent water market in NSW. In the context of the broader reform
of the water sector, this issue needs to be addressed if policy-makers are to
achieve the goals of reform since an active temporary water market is
unlikely to substitute adequately for the security needed to encourage
optimal investment in high-value enterprises. For example, increased invest-
ment in high-value horticultural enterprises may be incompatible with a
movement of temporary water alone. A smoothly functioning permanent
and temporary market would enable producers to select a mix of temporary
and permanent entitlements which re£ected their individual risk preferences.
More speci¢cally, accessing temporary entitlements involves greater pro-
duction risk since in some years there may simply be no water for sale.
Alternatively, purchasing permanent entitlements could involve greater
¢nancial risk as the enterprise must either hold excessive general security
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the administrative discounting factor applied at the time. While in principle
there should be an equivalence of the opportunity cost of both forms of risk,
a thin permanent water market seems likely to manifest itself in under-
investment in high-value irrigation enterprises.
3. Explaining thin markets for permanent entitlements
3.1 International evidence
Among the most thoroughly researched water transfers are those in the
western United States where transfers of water rights have occurred since
prior appropriation laws, over a century ago. The prior appropriation
doctrine implies `¢rst in time, ¢rst in right', and initially resulted in highest
priority access rights being acquired by miners and agricultural settlers. The
subsequent and signi¢cant movement of these rights from agriculture to
industrial and urban users is often cited as evidence of the active water
markets in these regions (see, for example, Colby, Crandall and Bush 1993).
However, closer examination of these claims suggests that, in many cases,
the analysis relates only to temporary transfers (see, for instance, Howitt
1994), or that longitudinal data sets have been compiled from many years to
build a sample suitable for analysis. For example, Colby et al. (1993)
examined price dispersions appertaining to the sale of permanent water
entitlements in the Gila-San Francisco Basin. Econometric analysis using a
hedonic pricing approach was used to test the signi¢cance of property right
priority, the £exibility of the water right, the high pro¢le nature of
participants involved in the trade, the date of the transaction, and the size of
the transfer. While it was shown that these variables were signi¢cant and
generally met a priori expectations, the data set comprised only 95 water
transactions between 1971 and 1987. This is an average of less than six
transactions per year and raises serious questions about the extent to which
so few transactions constitute an active and functional market.
On the basis that water markets are de¢ned by continuous voluntary
exchange, Michelsen (1994) sought to distinguish the administrative, insti-
tutional and structural characteristics which give rise to active permanent
water markets. His review of the Colorado-Big Thompson project is
particularly useful in the present context since it provides insight into those
features which may help explain the relative `thinness' of permanent water
markets in Australia. Michelsen found that the Colorado-Big Thompson
scheme was among the most active markets for permanent water rights, with
over 2000 transactions between 1970 and 1993 which accounted for over a
third of the project's total water entitlement. The success of this particular
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rights, the high reliability of supply [within the scheme] . . . , a well developed
distribution system, the large number and diversity of market participants,
and especially to institutional rules and administrative procedures that
minimise transfer restrictions and transaction costs' (Michelsen 1994, p. 981).
These conclusions appear to support earlier work by Young (1986) which
identi¢ed the lack of de¢ned property rights for water, institutional re-
strictions and transaction costs as impediments to the development of perma-
nent water markets. However, having identi¢ed the criteria for encouraging
the development of an e¡ective permanent water market, Michelsen (1994,
p. 981) nevertheless concluded that `the Colorado-Big Thompson market [is]
unique and unlikely to be duplicated in other situations'.
Ga¡ney (1997) also analysed the development of permanent water markets
in the United States and expressed disquiet at the number of obstacles that
were `gluing up the market' (ibid., p. 476). In many respects, the analysis
presented by Ga¡ney goes beyond the more conventional market constraints
identi¢ed by others. The lack of motivation for sellers is identi¢ed as a
critical element limiting the market's development. More speci¢cally, water
rights tend to be hoarded by all except those completely exiting agriculture
or those confronted with the cash drain implicit in holding excess land
subject to debt or property taxes. Hoarding behaviour is further explained
by the perception that demand will increase perpetually. In this respect,
Ga¡ney (1997, p. 480) observed that `demand keeps growing ö so why not
hold out another year?'. An additional consideration is the notion that
holders of water rights, when faced with uncertainty about property rights,
withhold them from sale for fear of creating the public perception that there
are surplus entitlements. Institutional inconsistencies in the treatment of
groundwater and implied and actual subsidies in some districts are also
identi¢ed as factors inhibiting the development of a functional market.
Finally, it is worth noting the contradiction between the `¢rming' of property
rights and the e¤cient operation of the market. Ga¡ney (1997) postulated
that the process of ¢rming property rights has not received su¤cient attention
in the United States. Moreover, `giveaways', where public property is simply
divested to the private sector for the purpose of enhancing the operation of
the market, tend to undermine the market process and encourage rent seeking
(ibid., p. 487).
Analyses of permanent water markets in other parts of the world also
provide support for the view that active markets for permanent water
entitlements are more the exception than the rule. A review of Chilean water
markets is instructive in this respect. Chile has progressive, pro-market
policies for the allocation of water resources following the proclamation of
the Water Code (1981). This legislation is unique in its embrace of market
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Bauer (1997, p. 639) argued that `no other country has gone so far, for so
long in the direction of pro-market water laws'. The Water Code is also cited
as the key stimulus in encouraging greater agricultural diversity, higher rates
of adoption of new water technologies and signi¢cant increases in water use
e¤ciency (Frias 1992; Munita 1994; Rosengrant, Gazmuri and Satya 1995;
Thobani 1997). However, despite apparently embracing market philosophy,
the strengthening of individual property rights to water and attempts to
foster a market mentality, there have been only limited transactions of
permanent water which are separate from land (Bauer 1997). This view is
supported by Hearne's (1995) analysis of water markets in Central and
Northern Chile which revealed demonstrable bene¢ts from trade, but only a
limited number of actual transactions.
Bauer (1997) has identi¢ed four kinds of obstacles which seem to have
limited the development of dynamic markets for permanent water entitle-
ments in Chile. First, there are geographic and infrastructure restrictions to
the functioning of permanent water markets in Chile. These include the
di¤culty and expense of moving water between basins and the rigidity of
associated infrastructure. Second, legal and administrative factors, such as
the uncertainty surrounding many titles, have constrained the development
of a permanent water market. This is exacerbated by the unspeci¢ed number
of unused valid rights that could be exerted and thus impinge upon rights
of existing users. Third, cultural and psychological attitudes are cited: it has
been argued that
it would be hard to exaggerate the real and symbolic importance of
irrigation in this semi-arid country, where it has taken centuries of labour
and willpower to bring water to dry lands and transform them into
productive ¢elds. . . . This history joins the constant threat of drought to
reinforce Chilean farmers' ingrained determination to hold onto their
water supplies at almost any cost.
(Bauer 1997, pp. 647^8)
Finally, prices and values are presented as factors which have sti£ed the
development of permanent water markets. In particular, it is contended that
ambiguous and uncertain price signals may invoke the view that the value
of permanent water is not well represented by the market price. Only the
most desperate o¡er permanent water for sale and many hold permanent
rights for speculative reasons.
In sum, the international literature on permanent water markets points
to at least six factors which seem to have impeded the development of
permanent water markets overseas. These included unclear or poorly de¢ned
property rights to access the resource, unreliable and variable supply, infra-
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behaviour and speculation, and cultural or sociological attributes that limit
market participation. In many respects, this list is neither comprehensive nor
exclusive and often cause and e¡ect are di¤cult to separate. The remainder
of this article explores the current NSW water reforms against these
obstacles in an e¡ort to explain the apparent thinness of the market for
permanent water entitlements.
4. Obstacles in the NSW market for permanent water entitlements
4.1 Unclear or poorly de¢ned rights to access and use the resource
An e¤cient market in tradable water entitlements is possible only where
the property rights associated with those entitlements are non-attenuated.
This implies that the right to use water must be clearly speci¢ed, enforceable
and enforced, exclusive, and capable of voluntary transfer (Pigram and
Musgrave 1989, p. 109). However, the question arises as to whether the
regulatory regimes currently being developed in NSW for managing the
public good uses of water are compatible with an e¤cient market equi-
librium. In this respect Dudley (1990, p. 81) observes that it is
important not to choose institutional arrangements which will increase
uncertainty [in the water industry]. Allowing reservoir allocation and
carryover policies to be modi¢ed at the discretion of politicians or
administrators, other than through market intervention, is likely to be
especially damaging.
To date, the realisation of environmental goals has rested heavily on
administrative or bureaucratic restrictions on irrigators in preference to
government-subsidised purchases of water for the environment through the
water market. Purchasing water for the environment directly from water
markets simultaneously `internalises' potentially deleterious third party
e¡ects, legitimises the environment as a consumer of water, and presumably
instills con¢dence in the property rights regime for those currently holding
water licences. However, these actions imply direct and discernible costs to
the public purse. On the other hand, regulation implies costs which are
easier to disguise and conceal from the public (Delforce, Pigram and
Musgrave 1990, p. 58). This view contrasts with the recommendations of
the Snowy Water Inquiry (1998, p. 17) which contends that `[T]he market
in permanent water is nowhere near large enough to cope with the demand
[for environmental £ows] in the medium term' and thus recommended the
use of e¤ciency savings from irrigation to provide environmental £ows east
of the divide.
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framework in part because of the lack of knowledge of the natural environ-
ment:
NSW has adopted an adaptive approach to water management. The water
required to maintain the fundamental health of river and groundwater
systems cannot be `set in stone'. Firstly, as new information becomes
available, it is probable that there will be better ways of achieving
the environmental, social and economic targets. Secondly, community
attitudes change over time ö the answer to the question `how healthy do
we want our rivers to be?' will not stay the same.
(DLWC 1998a, p. 11)
While this approach may reinforce environmental objectives, it undermines
the property rights of permanent water entitlements which manifests in
market failure. Even Peter Brinsley, Director of Access, DLWC concedes that
`water users have expressed concern that the rules under which they can
extract water have been constantly changing. Continual changes are making it
di¤cult for water users to undertake forward planning for and investment in
enterprises. There is a need for some stability in the water sharing and admin-
istration system' (Brinsley 1998, p. 4). These comments are consistent with
the broader observation of Alston, Eggertsson and North (1996, p. 4) that
[I]n an economy where entrepreneurship is decentralised, economic actors
will hold back on long-term investments unless the state makes credible
commitments to honour its contracts and respect individual ownership
rights. Because the state is usually the most powerful agency in the
community, and because circumstances often tempt rulers to take the short
view and expropriate wealth, institutional arrangements for controlling
opportunistic behaviour by the state have profound implications for
economic growth.
In short, the propensity for frequent legislative change undermines the
market process and prevents permanent water entitlements moving to their
highest-value use.
4.2 Variability of supply
Notwithstanding the aforementioned legislative changes, the supply of water
in NSW is inherently unreliable relative to many other parts of the world
(Brennan and Scoccimarro 1999, p. 72). One way of expressing this vari-
ability is by observing the ratio of maximum annual £ow to mean annual
£ow. In Europe and America this ratio commonly ranges between 3 and 15.
The Darling River, which drains three-quarters of NSW, has a value of
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times more water per hectare of irrigated land than Egypt and ten times the
volume held in India. Variability by location in the supply and demand for
water adds to the distinctiveness of the water industry in NSW. Approxi-
mately 75 per cent of the state's surface water occurs on the coastal fringe
while 80 per cent of the demand for water lies west of the divide (Burton
1993, pp. 1^2). While the variability of water supply systems may suggest
that a complete non-attenuation of water entitlements is impossible, we
argue that su¤cient knowledge on the part of market participants and
legislative certainty would permit the development of an equilibrium which
could at least approach e¤ciency. Su¤cient longitudinal data on the vari-
ability of river £ows and storage are available to establish the parameters of
the probability distribution of supply. Such data would permit the market
for entitlements to establish prices which re£ect this variability. However,
the uncertainty that stems from legislative and administrative change is more
vexatious. There is no equivalent longitudinal data set to assess the para-
meters of the probability distribution pertaining to the response of water
policy-makers. As a result, `[T]he uncertainty surrounding possible changes
in environmental allocations, which has already resulted in a reduction in
(o¡ allocation) water normally available to farmers in NSW, adds to the
existing problems associated with attenuated water rights' (Brennan and
Scoccimarro 1999, p. 70).
4.3 Infrastructure obstacles
A water transportation infrastructure has developed in NSW comprising
regulated river systems and thousands of kilometres of channels. While this
infrastructure has provided considerable economic and regional development
bene¢ts, the over-allocation of water resources to extractive uses has brought
considerable environmental costs. In transferring ownership of the irrigation
infrastructure to private corporations, the NSW state government acknow-
ledged a responsibility to `deferred maintenance'. Notwithstanding increased
expenditure to improve infrastructure and environmental remediation, river
channel constraints, such as the Barmah Choke and sections of the Murray
river between the Hume Dam and Yarrawonga, will always place some
limitation on the £exible transfer of water entitlements and therefore
constrain the development of the market (MDBC 1998, p. 13).
4.4 Excessive transaction and transfer costs
A number of transaction costs arise in the market for tradable water
entitlements. In general, the transaction costs of participating in the market
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ciated with the market for temporary water. It seems that this may partly
explain the relative paucity of trade in the former. First, search costs derive
from participants' e¡orts to establish the price of permanent water. In
this respect Challen (1997) noted evidence of price dispersions in South
Australian water markets and the need for regulatory agencies to provide
market information to improve the e¤ciency of the market. This issue is of
less signi¢cance in the temporary market where price information is readily
available. For example, the Southern Riverina Irrigation Districts Council
operates a water exchange which posts the monthly history of minimum,
maximum and average prices as well as the quantity of temporary water
traded on the Internet. Alternatively, permanent trades are usually con-
ducted by private treaty, where price information, in particular, remains
con¢dential. Thus, reliance on agents for price information acts as a restraint
on trade in the permanent water market relative to the temporary market.
Second, conveyancing requirements associated with permanent transfers are
more onerous and generally require professional legal assistance which raises
the cost of trade. Third, permanent transfers face additional administrative
costs. For example, in the MIL area administrative and conveyancing fees
imposed on temporary trades comprise a 3 per cent commission paid by
purchasers and a $A75 processing fee levied by the DLWC. By way of
contrast, the administrative costs for a permanent internal transfer comprise
a $A200 environmental assessment fee and a $A250 conveyancing fee, both
payable to MIL, and a $250 processing fee levied by the DLWC. As noted in
the second section, environmental assessment and infrastructure assessment
are also required before a permanent transfer can be approved at the local
level. Such assessments consider drainage, soil salinity and other environ-
mental factors as well as the capacity of local infrastructure to carry
additional £ows. Any transfer is therefore subject to veto at the local level.
Permanent transfers are further constrained by local requirements such as
the MIL rule that no more than 40 per cent of the transferrer's original
entitlement be permanently traded. Once approved by the local irrigation
company documentation is forwarded to the DLWC to ensure that it
meets speci¢c state criteria. Licensees holding entitlements outside irrigation
districts, such as river pumpers, also face higher administration cost for
permanent trades than temporary trades. Moreover, there are lengthy
administrative tasks to be completed which commonly delay the issuing of a
replacement licence by between six and twelve months (Marsden Jacob and
Associates 1999, p. 4). For example, at the state level all new irrigation
developments require the preparation of a Farm Water Management Plan
showing how best management practices will be employed. This requirement
persists despite evidence from South Australia suggesting such plans are
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McKay 1998, p. 1569). By way of contrast, such delays and processes are
not applicable to temporary trades of less than ¢ve seasons. Finally, if we
accept a broad de¢nition of transaction costs, the taxation treatment of
permanent and temporary trades may have implications which inhibit the
development of the former against the latter. Currently, there is greater
£exibility in the structure of payments for temporary trades which can
minimise the potential payment of stamp duty. For example, a signi¢cant
volume of temporary water can be purchased in small lots which fall below
the threshold payment that attracts stamp duty.
3 Similarly, purchasing
permanent water entitlements could attract future capital gains tax while
temporary purchases are currently regarded as a production expense.
4 In
short, both state and federal taxation laws may further erode any arbitrage
opportunities in the permanent market which inhibit the long-term move-
ment of the resource to its highest-value use.
4.5 Hoarding behaviour and speculation
Persistent changes to the legislation and administration of water resources
in NSW are not only manifest in confusion about property rights. In addition,
there is anecdotal evidence from irrigators that suggests the clawing back of
access rights makes existing water entitlements more valuable. In a recent
review of water trading commissioned by the DLWC, David Ledgerwood
from Murrumbidgee Irrigation o¡ered the following view: `Why would
anyone sell water permanently when government decisions are driving up the
value and therefore the future price? These same decisions have also made the
temporary market increasingly lucrative for someone with excess water'
(Marsden Jacob and Associates 1999, pp. 4^5).
Similarly, the risk of reduced access encourages the holding of excess water
entitlements since additional entitlements are now required to access an
equivalent quantity of water. For example, many farm businesses in the MIL
area historically used 100 per cent of their entitlement and an additional 10
to 20 per cent `o¡-allocation' £ows prior to the introduction of the MDBMC
3Pursuant to the Stamp Duties Act s11 ss(h) duty is payable on a statutory licence. The
duty on temporary licences depends on how the agreement is drawn up (assuming there is an
agreement). The duty is payable on the agreement only if it exceeds $A3000 for the term
of the agreement.
4Some uncertainty surrounds the application of Australian taxation law within the reform
agenda. Marsden Jacob and Associates (1999, p. 5.3) have recommended that the DLWC
clarify the rules applied by the Australian Tax O¤ce to prevent negative impacts on the
water reform process.
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the recommended provision of environmental £ows to the Snowy through
`e¤ciency savings' leave many irrigators holding water entitlements to
counter the risk of further legislative reductions in access rights.
In the second section we observed that NSW has been at the forefront
of pricing reform for bulk water (Furmage 1998). Theoretically, any under-
pricing or over-pricing on the part of IPART should be corrected by a
functioning market for entitlements. Moreover, the opportunity cost of a
megalitre of water should re£ect the sum of delivery charges and the
market value of the entitlement such that any change in the delivery
charge gives rise to an opposite and compensating change in the value of
the entitlement. However, if the market for entitlements is not well developed,
such compensating changes in the value of entitlements may not arise
immediately. This provides a clear incentive to hold entitlements for specu-
lative purposes particularly if there is a perception that delivery charges are
underestimated.
4.6 Cultural or sociological attributes that limit market participation
We have already noted the in£uence of cultural features in semi-arid
countries such as Chile which prevent the formation of active permanent
water markets. Evidence from Australia suggests that a similar impediment
may exist to the development of a permanent water market in NSW.
Bjornlund and McKay (1996), in reviewing lessons of tradable water
entitlements in South Australia, observed that almost half of those o¡ering
entitlements for sale stated that their primary motivation was the `need for
money'. Put di¡erently, only cash-strapped irrigators o¡er their entitlement
for sale since this is equivalent to `selling the back paddock'. Similarly,
modelling of the strategic responses of Murray irrigators to reduced water
has shown a signi¢cant correlation between the probability of exit and those
o¡ering permanent water entitlements for sale (Crase and Jackson 1998).
While champions of the water market would point to this as evidence of
market e¤ciency, restricting sellers only to those exiting agriculture leaves
the market excessively thin.
5. Conclusion
A review of the legislative and administrative reform of the water industry
in NSW has indicated that the success of many of the reforms rests partly on
an e¤cient market for tradable water entitlements. The available data on
trades suggest that, while the market for temporary transfers is active, the
same growth is not evident in the market for permanent water entitlements.
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likely to be accompanied by under-investment in high-value enterprises. In
this respect, the failure of the permanent water market stands to undermine
the e¡ective reform of the NSW water sector.
Our discussion of the market for water entitlements abroad suggests that
many of the common obstacles to the formation of robust water markets
overseas are also present in NSW. Property rights are not well de¢ned and
the use of an adaptive management framework, in particular, undermines
the certainty of current entitlement holders. The general hydrology of the
region is inherently unstable and unreliable, though data are readily available
for the market to encapsulate hydrological variability in the price of
entitlements. The distribution system, while adequate and the subject of
recent infrastructure improvement, produces geographical obstacles which
will always inhibit the transfer of some entitlements. Transaction and
transfer costs are relatively high for permanent water. Price information can
often only be obtained with the services of an agent and there are
considerable delays and administrative burdens associated with a trade of
permanent water. There are also cultural factors which preclude the inter-
action of some players in the permanent water market while others appear to
hoard entitlements because of uncertainty and the potential for speculative
gain. In general, these factors operate on the supply side of the market with
only the most desperate licensees o¡ering their entitlements for sale. Further
research of each of these impediments is warranted if the reform process is
to realise the economic and environmental goals sought by policy-makers.
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